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When individuals consider whether to become an entrepreneur, they often
have in mind a particular type of business, be it a consultancy, a shop, or
driving a lorry. The sector choice might depend on their cognitive ability,
financial constraints, knowledge of the sector, or their education level, among
other factors. In this paper, we revisit the question of who becomes an
entrepreneur taking into account the sector choice.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of entrepreneur-
ship and the literature on sector choice. We provide a framework that unifies
both strands by building a conceptual bridge using cognitive ability and
education level. Our theoretical framework is consistent with the empirical
evidence on the relationship between ability, education, and self-employment.
We develop an occupational choice model with two sectors where one has
human capital entry barriers. We denote by ’knowledge sector’ the sector
that requires having tertiary education credentials to operate in it, while
the ’traditional sector’ does not have any entry barriers. In this framework,
the education and occupation decisions are interrelated and affected by in-
dividuals’ ability level. Although the model does not have a closed-form
solution, we can characterize the equilibria. In any equilibrium, the least
able individuals will choose to be workers in the traditional sector while the
most able individuals decide to be entrepreneurs. The rest of the individu-
als decide between being entrepreneurs in the traditional sector or workers
in the knowledge sector. This leads to two types of equilibria: one where
low and high ability entrepreneurs coexist, and one with only high ability
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entrepreneurs.
We test the empirical implications of the model using the Survey of
Adult Skills (PIAAC: Programme for the International Assessment of Adult
Competencies). We estimate a multinomial logit model with four outcomes:
worker in the traditional sector; entrepreneur in the traditional sector; worker
in the knowledge sector; and entrepreneur in the knowledge sector. As pre-
dicted by the theoretical model, the least able individuals are more likely
to work in the traditional sector for the majority of countries in our sam-
ple. Results support the co-existence of low and high ability entrepreneurs in
most countries. We find the equilibrium with only high ability entrepreneurs
in the Eastern European countries, while results are unclear in the Nordic
countries.
The literature on the determinants of entrepreneurship has been partic-
ularly active in the last two decades achieving common consensus on de-
terminants such as gender, age (Blanchflower 2000, Leoni & Falk 2010), or
parental self-employment (Dunn & Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Eren & Sula, 2012),
among other factors (see Simoes, Crespo & Moreira, 2016 for a comprehen-
sive review of entrepreneurial determinants). There is, however, no consensus
on the effect of education on entrepreneurship. While several studies suggest
a positive impact of education on entrepreneurship (Kim, Aldrich & Keister,
2006), others find insignificant or negative results or even a U-shaped rela-
tionship (Blanchflower 2000; Poschke 2013). Van Der Sluis et al. (2008) per-
form a meta-analysis of the literature and conclude that education does not
significantly predict the likelihood of self-employment, although it increases
entrepreneurship performance. Bates (1995), instead, finds a heterogeneous
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effect across industries.
The ambiguous relationship found between education and entrepreneur-
ship is at odds with the implications of the classical models of occupational
choice, based on the seminal span-of-control model of Lucas (1978). They
predict a positive effect of individual ability on both, the probability of being
an entrepreneur and its performance (an exception is Poschke [2013] as dis-
cussed below). Since cognitive ability is rarely observable, empirical studies
often use education as a proxy for ability, and a positive relationship between
education and entrepreneurship is to be expected. The recent emergence of
new databases with information on individuals’ cognitive ability, measured
through test achievement, allows exploring directly its relationship with en-
trepreneurship. Few studies are available so far. Eren and Sula (2012) find
that cognitive ability reduces and non-cognitive ability increases the likeli-
hood of becoming an entrepreneur. Hartog et al (2010) find that technical,
mathematical and social ability benefit entrepreneurial incomes more than
wages, while verbal and clerical abilities have higher returns in wage em-
ployment. Unfortunately, they do not analyze the effect of ability on the
entry into self-employment. Levine and Rubinstein (2017) use the NLSY79
database and find that higher ability individuals are more likely to be incor-
porated self-employed, while ability does not affect the likelihood of being
unincorporated self-employed. We contribute to this literature as we are
able to disentangle both theoretically and empirically the effect of cognitive
ability and education on the individual decision to become an entrepreneur.
This paper also contributes to the literature studying sector choice of the
self-employed (Bates 1995; Lofstrom, Bates & Parker 2014). According to
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this literature, entry barriers shape not only the decision to become self-
employed, but also the sector that potential business owners are likely to
enter (Bates 1995). There are mainly two types of barriers affecting the
sector choice: financial and human capital barriers. Our paper studies the
impact of human capital barriers in one sector. Bates (1995) and Loftstrom
et al (2014) show the existence of human capital barriers to enter high-skilled
services.
Financial barriers are not considered here. Although many papers found
wealth to be a main determinant of entrepreneurship (Evans and Jovanovic,
1989; Evans and Leighton, 1989; Holtz-Eakin et al, 1994; Blanchflower and
Oswald, 1998), recent studies find financial constraints to be of a lesser impor-
tance for entrepreneurs (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004). Nonetheless, Loftstrom
et al (2014) show that when controlling for differences across industries, fi-
nancial constraints remain important, and Bianchi and Bobba (2013) find
that current financial constraints are less relevant than the expected future
transfers. In any case, financial barriers are a complementary channel to the
mechanism explored in this paper.
Our paper directly relates to several papers. First, it is related to the
work of Lofstrom, Bates, and Parker (2014) and Levine and Rubinstein
(2017) in that self-employed individuals are treated as a heterogeneous group.
Levine and Rubinstein (2017) distinguish between incorporated and un-
incorporated self-employed individuals. They find that incorporated self-
employment involves more non-routine cognitive tasks than unincorporated
self-employment. They identify that those individuals with a higher ability
and more ”illicit” tendencies in their youth are more likely to become in-
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corporated entrepreneurs. Lofstrom et al (2014) distinguish between sectors
with low and high-entry barriers and study how entry into entrepreneurship
is affected by wealth and human capital. In our work, we study human cap-
ital entry barriers with an endogenous education decision. Similarly to our
paper, Mestieri et al (2017) have endogenous decisions with respect to the
investment in education and entrepreneurship. They develop and quantify
a heterogeneous-agent model to investigate the importance of credit market
imperfections in the joint determination of human capital and entrepreneurial
investments in Mexico.
Our model is also closely related to Poschke (2013, 2018). He obtains the
co-existence of low and high ability entrepreneurs in equilibrium by assuming
that a firm’s productivity is uncertain before entry. Since individuals can
reject bad projects, searching for new projects has always a positive value.
In such a setup, the least able individuals are attracted to entrepreneurship
as they have low-value job alternatives. In contrast, our model considers a
sector-occupation choice without uncertainty. We obtain that individuals in
the second lowest and in the highest ability range engage in entrepreneurship.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a model
of occupational choice with different sectors. We test the implications of
the model in the rest of the paper. In section 3, we present the data and
methodology used in the empirical analysis. In section 4, we report the
results of the analysis with the PIAAC data. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The model
Consider an OLG model with a constant interest rate r and three sectors: a
final good sector and two intermediate sectors. We name the two intermedi-
ate sectors knowledge and traditional sector. The knowledge sector employs
skilled labor, while the traditional sector employs unskilled labor. Think for
instance about financial services and education for the knowledge sector, and
food and clothes for the traditional sector. The main difference is that to
work in the knowledge sector individuals must acquire education. Therefore,
we denote by skilled workers those that have been through education and
unskilled workers those that have not. All firms operate in a perfect com-
petitive framework. We skip time subscripts since we will study the steady
state.
2.1 Final good sector
There is a final good sector that combines the two intermediate goods in
a Cobb-Douglas production function Y = Y αu Y
1−α
s , where Yj is the total
amount of intermediate good j ∈ {u, s} produced in the economy; u refers
to the sector that employs unskilled labor (traditional sector); and s refers
to the sector that employs skilled labor (knowledge sector). We set the final
good as the numeraire. The final good sector problem is:
maxY αu Y
1−α
s − puYu − psYs,










There are two intermediate sectors. The knowledge sector hires skilled labor
and the traditional sector hires unskilled labor. An initial fixed cost kj is
required to start producing in each sector, j ∈ {u, s}. Moreover, only skilled
individuals can start a firm in the knowledge sector. The production function
in both sectors is increasing and concave in labor, and the productivity of the
firm is determined by the entrepreneur’s ability xi (as in Lucas 1978). The
production function of the firm of an entrepreneur with ability xi in sector
j is yj = xil
β
j where β ∈ (0, 1) and lj is the amount of workers employed in
the firm. Profits are:
πj (xi) = pjxil
β
j − wjlj − kj, (3)
where pj is the price of good from sector j and wj its wage. The first order
conditions of the intermediate sectors are:
pjxiβl
β−1
j = wj for j ∈ {u, s} . (4)
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Entrepreneurs with higher ability employ more workers. Moreover, profits
for sector j are increasing and convex in ability:









Apart from the education requirement in the knowledge sector, there is free-
entry.
2.3 Individuals
Suppose an overlapping generations model. Each generation has a measure
1. Individuals live for two periods. They differ in their ability xi, which
ranges between 0 and 1. Let us assume a distribution of ability defined by
Γ.
In the first period, individuals decide whether to get education or to
work as an unskilled worker. The cost of education is inversely related to
their ability (1/xi).
1 We assume that individuals cannot study and work at
the same time. If they decide to work as an unskilled worker, they earn a
1Although in reality, the ability to run a firm is not perfectly correlated with the ability
to succeed in education, we use a single ability measure in our model. There are two main
reasons for that. First, it simplifies the model and, as long as the ability to run a firm and
the ability to succeed in education are positively correlated, the main results hold. We
provide some evidence of the positive correlation in section 3. Second, we do not have a
good measure of entrepreneurial ability, therefore, we prefer to consider a unique ability
measure (numerical skills) as a proxy for both types of ability in both the model and the
empirical analysis.
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wage wu, which is independent of an individual’s ability xi.
In the second period, individuals choose their occupation given their ed-
ucation level. If they are unskilled, they can choose between working as
unskilled for a wage wu or to create a firm in the traditional sector. If they
are skilled, they have three options: working as skilled for a wage ws, creating
a firm in the traditional sector or creating a firm in the knowledge sector.
Individuals consume in the second period only. They get utility from
consumption and disutility from the cost of education. u(ci, Ie) = ci − Iexi ,
where Ie ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether the individual got education or not.
Firms disappear after entrepreneurs die. We solve the individuals’ decision
using backwards induction.
2.3.1 Occupational choice
In the second period, individuals choose an occupation given their education
level. We analyze the choice of the unskilled individual in lemma 1, and the
choice of the skilled individual in lemmas 2 and 3.
Lemma 1 Unskilled individuals with ability level xi < x̄u choose to be a
worker in the traditional sector, while unskilled individuals with xi ≥ x̄u
choose to be an entrepreneur in the traditional sector, where x̄u satisfies
πu(x̄u) = wu.
Proof. Suppose that an individual has no education. Then the individual
can only choose between being a salaried worker or an entrepreneur in the
traditional sector. The unskilled individual will choose to be an entrepreneur
in the traditional sector rather than to work in the traditional sector if
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pu (1− β)1−β ββ
≡ x̄u. (6)
Therefore, an unskilled individual will be an entrepreneur in the traditional
sector if xi > x̄u and will work in the traditional sector if xi < x̄u.
Let’s denote by Vu (xi) the value of being an uneducated individual.
Vu (xi) =









Assumption 1 implies that the effect of ability on profits is larger in the
knowledge sector than in the traditional sector, as shown in figures 1 and 2.
There is no reason why this should be satisfied, so we consider the alternative
case as well in lemma 3.
Lemma 2 Suppose assumption 1 is satisfied. Let x̂s satisfy πs(x̂s) = ws,
and let x̃s satisfy πs(x̃s) = πu(x̃s). Then,











, skilled individuals with
xi < x̂s choose to be workers in the knowledge sector, while those skilled
individuals with xi ≥ x̂s choose to be entrepreneurs in the knowledge
sector. See Figure 1.












, skilled individuals with
xi < x̄s choose to be workers in the knowledge sector, skilled individuals
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with xi ∈ (x̄s, x̃s) choose to be entrepreneurs in the traditional sector,
while those skilled individuals with xi ≥ x̃s choose to be entrepreneurs
in the knowledge sector, where x̄s satisfies πu(x̄s) = ws. See Figure 2.
Proof in Appendix A.














 −1/xi + ws if xi < x̂s−1/xi + πs(xi) if xi > x̂s , (8)
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−1/xi + ws if xi < x̄s
−1/xi + πu(xi) if xi ∈ (x̄s, x̃s)
−1/xi + πs(xi) if xi > x̃s
. (9)
Lemma 3 Suppose assumption 1 is not satisfied. Let x̂s satisfy πs(x̂s) = ws,
and let x̃s satisfy πs(x̃s) = πu(x̃s). Then,











, skilled individuals with
xi < x̂s choose to be workers in the knowledge sector, while those skilled
individuals with xi ≥ x̂s choose to be entrepreneurs in the traditional
sector.












, skilled individuals with
xi < x̄s choose to be workers in the knowledge sector, skilled individuals
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with xi ∈ (x̄s, x̃s) choose to be entrepreneurs in the knowledge sector,
while those skilled individuals with xi ≥ x̃s choose to be entrepreneurs
in the traditional sector, where x̄s satisfies πu(x̄s) = ws.
Proof in Appendix B.














 −1/xi + ws if xi < x̂s−1/xi + πu(xi) if xi > x̂s , (10)
but this can never happen in equilibrium, since we need some skilled in-
dividuals to become entrepreneurs in the knowledge sector. Instead, when











, the value of being
a skilled individual is:
Vs (xi) =

−1/xi + ws if xi < x̄s
−1/xi + πs(xi) if xi ∈ (x̄s, x̃s)
−1/xi + πu(xi) if xi > x̃s
. (11)
2.3.2 Education choice
In the first period, individuals choose whether to invest in education. They
will do so if their utility is larger being skilled than unskilled.
Let V (xi) be the value of an individual with ability xi.
V (xi) = max {Vu (xi) , Vs (xi)} , (12)
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where Vu(xi) is defined in (7) and Vs(xi) is defined in (8)-(11) depending on
the parameter values.






















if 0 < xi < x̄u
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if x̂s < xi < 1
. (13)






















if 0 < xi < x̄u
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.
(14)
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if x̄s < xi < x̃s
max
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Let us denote by VEj(xi) and VWj(xi) the value functions for being en-
trepreneur in sector j and for being a worker in sector j, respectively.
VEs (xi) = −1/xi + πs(xi).
VEu (xi) = wu (1 + r) + πu(xi).
VWs (xi) = −1/xi + ws.
VWu (xi) = wu (2 + r) .
We next provide the market-clearing conditions of the model before solv-
ing the occupation-sector choice.
2.4 Steady-state equilibrium
In this section we present the equations that close the equilibrium. Although
it is not possible to find a closed-form solution, we are able to characterize
the equilibria.









where ej denotes the distribution of entrepreneurs in sector j.
The market clearing conditions of the intermediate goods markets set the
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prices ps, pu.












Wages are such that labor markets clear.
∫
lsdes = Lst − es,∫
ludeu = Lut + Lut+1 − eu,
where Lst is the amount of individuals born at t − 1 that got education
and Lut = 1− Lst.
Given that in any equilibrium there must be some positive amount of
individuals in each sector-occupation category, we can characterize the types
of equilibrium in this economy.
Proposition 1 Under assumption 1, there are three types of equilibria. In
all of them, the bottom ability individuals choose to be workers in the tradi-
tional sector, while the top ability individuals prefer to be entrepreneurs in
the knowledge sector. Moreover, the middle range ability individuals decide
to become workers in the knowledge sector. The three equilibria differ on
which individuals decide to become entrepreneurs in the traditional sector.
1. Two groups of individuals may become entrepreneurs in the traditional
sector: second bottom and second top ability range individuals (see Fig-
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ure 3).
2. Only the second bottom ability range individuals choose to be entrepreneurs
in the traditional sector (see Figure 4).
3. Only the second top ability range individuals decide to be entrepreneurs
in the traditional sector (see Figure 5).
Proof in appendix C.
Proposition 2 When assumption 1 is not satisfied, there are two types of
equilibria. In all of them, the bottom ability individuals choose to be work-
ers in the traditional sector, while the top ability individuals prefer to be
entrepreneurs alternating traditional and knowledge sector. Moreover, the
middle range ability individuals decide to become workers in the knowledge
sector. The two equilibria differ on whether the second bottom ability range
individuals decide to become entrepreneurs in the traditional sector (equilib-
rium 4) or workers in the knowledge sector (equilibrium 5).
Proof in appendix D.
Propositions 1 and 2 summarize the possible types of equilibria. In equi-
libria 1 and 2 of Proposition 1 and equilibrium 4 of Proposition 2, low and
high ability entrepreneurs coexist. In contrast, in the rest of equilibria, only
high ability individuals become entrepreneurs.
Corollary 1 Let x̄e satisfy VWu(x̄e) = VWs(x̄e). When x̄e > x̄u, that is, when
1




pu (1− β)1−β ββ
,
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Figure 3: Assumption 1 holds. Case x̄e > x̄u and x̃e > x̂s > x̂
′′
e . High and
low ability entrepreneurs in the traditional sector.
individuals from the second bottom ability range decide to become entrepreneurs
in the traditional sector.
Proof included in the proof of proposition 1 (Appendix C).
The corollary states the condition under which there will be low ability
entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs will operate in the traditional sector. In
all equilibria, there are high ability entrepreneurs in the knowledge sector
or in both sectors. Therefore, low and high ability entrepreneurs coexist in
equilibrium under the condition stated in the corollary. In countries where
the returns to education in salaried jobs, unskilled wages and the cost of
starting a business in the traditional sector are low, it is more likely to observe
low ability entrepreneurs.
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Figure 4: Assumption 1 holds. Case x̄e > x̄u and x̃e < x̂s < x̂
′′
e . High ability
entrepreneurs in the knowledge sector and low ability entrepreneurs in the
traditional sector.




The previous model has two main types of equilibria:
1. Low ability entrepreneurs in the traditional sector and high ability
entrepreneurs in possibly both sectors (e.g. Figures 3 and 4).
2. High ability entrepreneurs in both the traditional and the knowledge
sector (e.g. Figure 5).
The ability distribution and the parameters of the model determine the
equilibrium outcome. For instance, countries with low ku are more likely to
be in an equilibrium with low ability entrepreneurs in the traditional sector
(see Corollary 1). In our empirical approach, by directly observing the ability
level and sector choice of entrepreneurs, we can identify the equilibrium in
the country.
There are two main empirical implications of the model:
1. Education does not have a clear relationship with entrepreneurship.
2. Ability and entrepreneurship have a linear relationship exclusively in
the case of an equilibrium with only high ability entrepreneurs. Oth-
erwise, the relationship is bimodal: high and low ability entrepreneurs
co-exist in equilibrium.
The first implication is consistent with the existing empirical evidence, which
does not find a clear relationship between education and entrepreneurship
(Van Der Sluis et al, 2008; Simoes, Crespo & Moreira, 2016). In the rest of
the paper, we characterize the equilibria of different groups of countries and
test the empirical implications of the model.
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3 Data and Methodology
We use PIAAC Survey data to test our model. PIAAC is an international
survey commissioned by the OECD. The survey was conducted between Au-
gust 2011 and March 2012 for the first round of countries, and between April
2014 and March 2015 for the second round. PIAAC contains explicit assess-
ment of cognitive ability (numeracy, literacy, and ICT skills). Overall, the
survey includes individuals from 32 countries. Each country has a minimum
sample size required of 5,000 completed cases.2 We select 22 countries for our
analysis, which we group into five groups according to their education sys-
tems and labor market characteristics (see Table I). Group 1 is comprised of
the Nordic countries, characterized by high equality (Salverda and Checchi,
2015) and high social mobility (Solon 2002). Education is mostly publicly
funded in these countries (OECD 2018a). Group 2 is formed by Austria,
Germany, and the Netherlands. They have a dual education system, with
a prominent vocational education (Eurydice 2015). They have a strong link
between education and the labor market and score high in the employment
protection legislation index (Salverda and Checchi, 2015). The third group is
formed by the Anglo-Saxon countries. These countries are characterized by
large income inequalities, as measured by the Gini index, and liberal policies,
which lead to high easiness to create new businesses (World Bank 2018) and
low employment protection legislation (Salverda and Checchi, 2015). Bel-
gium, France, Spain, and Italy form the fourth group of countries. They
are characterized by low inequality (Salverda and Checchi, 2015), rigid labor
2See http://www.oecd.org/skills/piaac/publicdataandanalysis/#d.en.408927 for a de-
tailed description of the survey.
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markets, and a large long-term unemployment rate (OECD 2018b). Finally,
the Eastern European countries are in group 5. They all went through a
transition from communism towards a market economy. They have rather
high levels of inequality (Salverda and Checchi, 2015). Additionally, coun-
tries in groups 4 and 5 exhibit a rather low index of easiness of doing business
in 2012 (World Bank 2018).
[Table I around here]
We restrict our sample to individuals aged between 25 and 65 years old
excluding those that could be still in education and those in the retirement
age. We delete cases with missing data on any of the explanatory variables.
Finally, we also drop all respondents working in the armed forces and ex-
traterritorial bodies.
In our theoretical model, we require individuals to have a tertiary edu-
cation credential to enter the knowledge sector, while there is no such re-
quirement for the traditional sector. Most occupations in industries such as
education or health, for instance, are likely to belong to the knowledge sec-
tor. For other industries, such as construction or mining, some occupation
levels require higher education while others do not. Think about architects
or engineers as opposed to bricklayers, for instance. Therefore, in the em-
pirical part, we classify knowledge and traditional sector taking into account
both, industry and occupation. In particular, we consider a job to be in the
knowledge sector if 50% of the individuals in the industry or occupation in
question have tertiary education3 (we use the 1-digit classification of ISIC
3We use individuals between 25 and 64 years old currently employed to compute the
percentage of individuals with tertiary education at the country level. In a robustness
exercise, we pool all countries. In a second robustness exercise, we use a 60% threshold
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rev 4 for industry and 1-digit ISCO 2008 for occupation).
Unsurprisingly, we find that most jobs in blue-collar or elementary oc-
cupations are part of the traditional sector while those that work as pro-
fessionals are found in the knowledge sector (Table II). Table III shows the
distribution of jobs across industries. It reveals that all jobs in the education
and scientific industries belong to the knowledge sector as expected. Other
industries, such as information and communication, finance and insurance,
real estate, public administration, health and social work, and arts and en-
tertainment, have a majority of individuals in the knowledge sector. Instead,
most jobs in construction or wholesale and retail pertain to the traditional
sector according to our classification.
[Tables II and III around here]
Our sector classification is in some way related to the work in Levine
and Rubinstein (2017). They distinguish between incorporated and unincor-
porated entrepreneurs. They find that education and non-routine analytical
skills make an individual more likely to become an incorporated entrepreneur,
while non-routine manual skills increase the likelihood to become an unin-
corporated entrepreneur. In their Table VI, we can observe that industries at
the top of non-routine analytical and non-routine direction and control task
requirements belong most likely to our knowledge sector (engineering and
architectural services, accounting, educational services and the like). More-
over, the top industries in non-routine manual task requirements are likely
to belong to our traditional sector (taxicab and trucking services, logging,




In our theoretical model, ability affects both, the productivity of the
entrepreneur and the probability of succeeding in education. PIAAC data
has a good measure of cognitive ability (numeracy skills), which is strongly
related to the probability of succeeding in education. Regarding the measure
of the productivity of the entrepreneur, one could use the income of self-
employed individuals. However, income in the PIAAC survey is self-reported
and probably has a large measurement error. Moreover, it is not available
for Austria, Canada, Germany, Sweden and the US. In tables IV-VI, we
explore whether numeracy skills are a good measure of productivity of the
entrepreneur. Table IV reports the regression of the logarithm of the income
of the self-employed on numeracy skills and other variables for the countries
that provide this information. Numeracy skills clearly increase the income
of the self-employed in all groups of countries. Therefore, the assumption of
a positive effect of the cognitive ability on the success of the entrepreneurs
(higher profits) is satisfied in the PIAAC data. Tables V and VI reinforce the
use of numeracy skills instead of literacy skills. Literacy skills have a positive
effect on income in all groups of countries except for group 2 (Table V). When
both variables are used together, numeracy skills show stronger explanatory
power (Table VI). Therefore, we use numeracy skills as a measure of ability
for education and entrepreneurship in all the analysis.
[Tables IV to VI around here]
We distinguish four possible professions in our analysis: a salaried worker
in the traditional sector, a self-employed individual in the traditional sector,
a salaried worker in the knowledge sector, and a self-employed individual
26
in the knowledge sector. Table VII shows the final sample sizes for each
profession in each group of countries.
[Table VII around here]
In a first analysis, we estimate the probability to become self-employed.
This allows testing the empirical implications of the model (see Section 2.5).








βk,j/sabilityik + βx,j/sXi. (19)
The dependent variable is the log-odds ratio of being in profession j rather
in profession s, where Pij stands for the probability that an individual i is in
profession j. Ability is the variable of interest. It refers to numeracy skills,
which were assessed with an explicit test in the survey. We create dummies
indicating the quartile of the ability distribution per country. We control for
gender and age bands in all estimations. We add tertiary education controls
in subsequent estimations. The complete model includes dummies for the
education of the father as well. Fathers education proxies higher family
wealth and better social capital. The former positively affects the likelihood
of self-employment; the latter can positively affect both, the self-employment
as well as the salaried employment. The descriptive statistics of all variables
are presented in table VIII.
[Table VIII around here]
The main analysis will let us identify which type of equilibrium holds
in each group of countries. According to our model, there are three poten-
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tial equilibria. The main difference between them is who becomes an en-
trepreneur in the traditional sector: individuals in the second lowest ability
range, individuals in the second highest ability range, or both. We estimate
the model for the different groups of countries.
4 Empirical results
In order to compare our results with previous studies, we first estimate
the likelihood of being self-employed without distinguishing between sec-
tors. In Table IX, we test the relationship between education level and self-
employment. It becomes evident that education does not have a consistent
effect on self-employment across the groups of countries. Having tertiary
education decreases the likelihood of self-employment in the Nordic and the
Anglo-Saxon countries, while it increases it in the group composed of Austria,
Germany, and the Netherlands. In this group, having upper-secondary edu-
cation decreases the likelihood of self-employment.4 In contrast, women are
less likely to be self-employed in all country groups, and being married has
a consistent positive effect. Immigrants are more likely to be self-employed
in the Anglo-Saxon countries and less likely in the group 2. There are no
differences between immigrants and natives in the rest of the groups.
Table X shows the effect of ability on self-employment. Numeracy skills
have a positive or non-significant effect on self-employment. This is consistent
with the empirical implications of the model. Results for gender, married and
immigrant status do not change.
4This might be a product of the dual education system in these countries.
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Table XI reports the results when controlling for education, ability, and
father’s education simultaneously. The results on education remain irregular
across groups of countries. Numeracy skills become positive and significant in
all groups except in the Nordic countries. Having a father with tertiary edu-
cation increases the likelihood of self-employment in most groups of countries.
Instead, a father with upper-secondary education decreases the likelihood of
self-employment in the group with a dual education system and increases it
in the group with strong labor market rigidities.
A positive effect of ability would seem to support the equilibrium where
all entrepreneurs have high ability. To confirm this result, we estimate the
previous equation using quartiles of ability instead of a continuous measure
of numeracy skills. Results are presented in Table XII. Only for group 5, the
effect of ability on self-employment is really increasing across quartiles, sug-
gesting an equilibrium with only high ability self-employed in these countries.
In group 3, the coefficients of quartiles 2 and 4 are larger than the coefficient
of quartile 3. This is consistent with the bimodal distribution expected in an
equilibrium with low and high ability self-employed. For groups 1, 2 and 4,
results are inconclusive. [Tables IX to XII around here]
In what follows we distinguish between traditional and knowledge sectors
to further assess the empirical implications of our theoretical model. Ta-
bles XIII to XVII report the results of the multinomial estimation based on
equation (19) per each group of countries. In all these tables, the first three
columns show the results of estimation (1), which controls for age, gender,
married and immigrant status only; columns forth to sixth show the results
of estimation (2), which adds a control for upper-secondary and tertiary edu-
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cation levels of the individual; finally, the last three columns show the results
of estimation (3), which adds the father’s education level dummies. The base
category of the dependent variable is always a worker in the traditional sec-
tor. Hence, the coefficients show the effect of each independent variable on
each category relative to a worker in the traditional sector.
[Tables XIII to XVII around here]
The probability of being in the knowledge sector, whether as a worker or
as a self-employed, as compared to being a worker in the traditional sector
increases with the ability quartile in all cases. Coefficients of ability quartile
are positive, significant, and increasing with the ability for the salaried worker
and the self-employed in the knowledge sector. This is true for all groups of
countries and all specifications. However, there are large differences in the
coefficients of ability quartiles to explain the choice of being an entrepreneur
in the traditional sector (SE-TS). While ability does not explain this choice in
the Nordic countries (Table XIII), the effect is significantly different from zero
in the other groups. In group 2 (Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands),
the three highest quartiles have a positive effect on the probability of self-
employment in the traditional sector (Table XIV). Once we control for the
educational attainment of the individual, quartile 3 loses some significance
level, although it remains significant at the 10%. We conclude that both,
low and high ability entrepreneurs co-exist in the traditional sector (as in
figure 3). This result holds and is even clearer for the Anglo-Saxon countries
(Table XV) where the coefficient of the third quartile is insignificant. For
the group of countries with a rigid labor market (Belgium, France, Italy, and
Spain), only quartiles 2 and 3 are significant in estimation (1), while quartile
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4 becomes also significant once we control for education (Table XVI). Results
are compatible with an equilibrium with low and high ability entrepreneurs
in the traditional sector, although we do not manage to identify the range of
ability where there is the trough. Finally, we obtain an equilibrium with only
high ability entrepreneurs for the Eastern European countries (Table XVII).
Only quartiles 3 and 4 are positive and significant and increasing with ability
quartile for this group of countries.
With respect to the other variables of the estimation, we observe that
consistent with existing research women are less likely to be self-employed,
although in some cases, women are more likely to be self-employed in the
knowledge sector than workers in the traditional sector (groups 3 and 5).
Having upper secondary or tertiary education increases the likelihood to be
in the knowledge sector by construction. Finally, having a father with tertiary
education helps to get into the knowledge sector (either as a worker or self-
employed) in all countries. Moreover, in most cases, having a father with
secondary education decreases the likelihood of being self-employed in the
traditional sector rather than a worker in this sector, while having a father
with tertiary education increases this probability.
The coefficients comparing the probability of being self-employed or a
worker in the knowledge sector are less clear-cut. We analyze this by re-
estimating our models with worker in the knowledge sector as the base cat-
egory. Results are reported in tables XVIII-XXII. The last column of each
estimation reports the probability of self-employment in the knowledge sector
relative to being a worker in this sector. Results reveal that ability does not
explain the choice of self-employment in the knowledge sector in the groups 1
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and 2. For Anglo-Saxon countries (group 3), not being in the first quartile of
the ability distribution increases the probability of being self-employed with
respect to being a worker in the knowledge sector. For the group comprised
of Belgium, France, Italy and Spain, only the second quartile is statistically
significant. Its negative sign indicates that these individuals are more likely
to be workers than self-employed in the knowledge sector. Finally, in the
Eastern European countries, all coefficients are positive and significant, al-
though the effect seems bimodal.
According to the model presented above, we should observe that the
probability to be self-employed in the knowledge sector rather than a worker
in this sector increases with ability. However, the empirical results are not
always consistent with the model. A potential way to accommodate the
model to the previous results could be by assuming that the wage in the
knowledge sector is increasing with ability. Then, the choice between being
a worker or an entrepreneur in the knowledge sector would be less clear, as
the empirical results show.
We perform several robustness exercises for these analyses, which are pro-
vided in a supplementary appendix. First, we use quintiles of ability instead
of quartiles. Then, we change the definition of traditional and knowledge
sector, by using a threshold of 60% of individuals with tertiary education
instead of 50%, or by using a homogeneous classification of sectors across
countries. Finally, we classify all individuals with tertiary education to be in
the knowledge sector, independently of their job. The main results do not
change in any of these exercises.
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5 Conclusions
The empirical literature has so far not found a clear sign on the effect of ed-
ucation and ability on entrepreneurship. Moreover, the observed coexistence
of low and high ability entrepreneurs is difficult to explain with the classical
occupational choice model. By including the sector choice, which is linked
to education investment through human capital entry barriers in one sector,
our model allows for the coexistence of low and high ability entrepreneurs.
The empirical analysis corroborates the existence of different equilibria. Re-
sults are consistent with the existence of low and high ability entrepreneurs
in the traditional sector in most groups of countries. In contrast, the results
for Eastern European countries suggest an equilibrium with only high ability
entrepreneurs. For the Nordic countries, results are unclear.
This paper provides an alternative explanation for the relationship be-
tween ability, education, and entrepreneurship. The theoretical model ad-
vances our understanding of entrepreneurship in several ways. First, it shows
that the inconclusive results on the relationship between education and en-
trepreneurship come from the bad measurement of ability through education.
Using PIAAC survey we are able to show the existence of high and low ability
entrepreneurs in several country groups controlling for their education levels.
Secondly, we show that ability drives individual decisions whether to start
a business, not education. Our setup allows for the existence of low ability
entrepreneurs based on rational decisions of individuals. It is an alternative
explanation to the out-of-necessity entrepreneurship in the literature.
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A Proof of Lemma 2
Let us analyze the occupation choice of an individual who got education in
the first period. Given that ws > wu, the skilled individual will never want
to work in the traditional sector. Hence, the choice is among being a worker
in the skilled sector, being an entrepreneur in the traditional sector, or being
an entrepreneur in the knowledge sector.
• The skilled individual will choose to be an entrepreneur in the tradi-
tional sector rather than work in the knowledge sector if πu (xi) > ws.
Denote by x̄s the ability level that makes the individual indifferent




pu (1− β)1−β ββ
.
Since πu(xi) is increasing with xi, then individuals with xi > x̄s will
prefer to create a firm in the traditional sector and those with xi < x̄s
will prefer to work in the knowledge sector.
• The skilled individual will choose to be an entrepreneur in the knowl-
edge sector rather than work in knowledge sector if πs (xi) > ws. De-





ps (1− β)1−β ββ
.
Since πs(xi) is increasing in ability, then individuals with xi > x̂s will
prefer to create a firm in the knowledge sector and those with xi < x̂s
will prefer to work in the knowledge sector.
34
• An individual with ability xi will choose to be an entrepreneur in
the knowledge sector rather than in the traditional sector if πs (xi) >
πu (xi). Let x̃s be the ability level that leaves the individual indifferent

















Under assumption 1 individuals with xi > x̃s will prefer to create a firm
in the knowledge sector and those with xi < x̃s will prefer to create a
firm in the traditional sector.
Suppose that x̂s ≥ x̃s. Then, since under assumption 1, πs(xi) is steeper
than πu(xi), it must be that x̄s ≥ x̂s. In such a case, individuals with ability
xi < x̂s choose to work in the knowledge sector, while those with xi > x̂s
choose to be entrepreneurs in the knowledge sector. See Figure 1.
Suppose that x̂s < x̃s. Then, since under assumption 1, πs(xi) is steeper
than πu(xi), it must be that x̄s < x̂s. In such a case, individuals with ability
xi < x̄s choose to work in the knowledge sector, those with xi ∈ (x̄s, x̃s)
choose to be entrepreneurs in the traditional sector, and those with xi > x̃s
choose to be entrepreneurs in the knowledge sector. See Figure 2.
B Proof of Lemma 3











, if assumption 1 were not satisfied,
skilled workers with xi < x̂s would choose to be workers in the knowledge
sector and those with xi < x̂s would always prefer to be entrepreneurs in the
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traditional sector than in the knowledge sector since πs(xi) < πu(xi) for all
xi > x̃s and x̃s < x̂s.











, then there is a possibility to
have an equilibrium with top ability individuals being entrepreneurs in the
traditional sector and the second top ability individuals being entrepreneurs
in the knowledge sector.
The value of being unskilled and skilled is
Vu (xi) =




−1/xi + ws if xi < x̄s
−1/xi + πs(xi) if xi ∈ (x̄s, x̃s)
−1/xi + πu(xi) if xi > x̃s
,
respectively.
C Proof of Proposition 1
In any equilibrium, there must be a positive amount of individuals in each
occupation-sector. We first analyze the value functions of each occupation
choice to be able to plot them. Second, we prove that all the ability ranges of
the value functions (13) and (14) are non-empty. This implies to prove that
x̂s > x̄u for (13) and that x̄s > x̄u for (14). Third, we solve the individual
education choice for each case in subsections C.1 and C.2.
• Let us first analyze the value functions VEj(xi) and VWj(xi), so that we
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can plot them.
VEs (xi) is increasing, concave until some xi and convex afterwards.
Moreover, lim
xi→0
VEs (xi) = −∞.
VEu (xi) is increasing and convex, with VEu (0) = wu (1 + r)− ku.
VWs (xi) is increasing and concave, with lim
xi→0




Moreover, VEs (xi)− VWs (xi) = πs(xi)− ws, which is zero for only one
xi. Hence, VEs (xi) and VWs (xi) cross only once.
Finally, VWu (xi) is a constant.
• Let us now prove that x̄u < x̂s in any equilibrium when x̃s < x̂s. We
do that by contradiction. Suppose that x̄u > x̂s. Then the occupation-










if 0 < xi < x̂s
max
{





if x̂s < xi < x̄u
max
{





if x̄u < xi < 1
.
But notice that in equilibrium there must be some individuals in each
occupation and sector. Then, it must be that wu (1 + r) + πu(x̄u) >
−1
x̄u
+ πs(x̄u) so that there are entrepreneurs in the traditional sector.
This implies that wu (2 + r) >
−1
x̄u
+ πs(x̄u) (because πu(x̄u) = wu).
Therefore, all individuals with x̂s < xi < x̄u will choose to be unskilled




and since πs(x̂s) = ws, nobody would want to be a skilled worker.
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Hence, x̄u > x̂s cannot be an equilibrium. Therefore, in equilibrium
x̄u < x̂s always.
• We now need to prove that x̄s > x̄u in any equilibrium when x̃s < x̂s.
Notice that x̄s > x̄u always since in equilibrium ws > wu or nobody
would have incentives to become a skilled worker.
In the next subsections we analytically solve the education choice in the
two cases identified above.










Here we solve the choices defined in the value function (13).
• Individuals with xi < x̄u either work as unskilled both periods or get
educated and work as skilled in the second period. Individuals will get
educated as long as:
xi >
1
ws − (2 + r)wu
= x̄e,
where x̄e is the ability level that makes individuals indifferent between
the two options. In equilibrium it must be that ws > (2 + r)wu, so
that someone wants to study and work in the knowledge sector in equi-
librium. Therefore, x̄e > 0. If x̄e > x̄u, all individuals with xi < x̄u
decide to be unskilled workers. If x̄e < x̄u, individuals with xi < x̄e
will choose to be unskilled workers and those with x̄e < xi < x̄u will
choose to get education and work in the knowledge sector.
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• For x̄u < xi < x̂s, individuals choose between studying and working in
the knowledge sector or being an entrepreneur in the traditional sector.
The individual with ability x̂e is indifferent between the two options.
−1
x̂e
+ ws = wu (1 + r) + πu (x̂e) .
The LHS is an increasing and concave function of x̂e and the RHS
is increasing and convex. They either never cross or do it twice. In
the former case, all individuals in this ability range would prefer to be
entrepreneurs in the traditional sector than to work as skilled workers.
This can only happen in equilibrium if x̄e < x̄u, otherwise there would
be no workers in the knowledge sector.
In order to analyze the case with two solutions, let us denote the two
ability levels that leave individuals indifferent between the two options
by x̂′e and x̂
′′




e . Let’s see if these ability levels are
within the range x̄u < xi < x̂s.
As it can be seen in Figures 3 and 4, if VEu (x̄e) > VWu (x̄e), then
x̂′e > x̄u. Since VEu (x̄e) > VWu (x̄e) when πu (x̄e) > wu, x̂
′
e > x̄u if
x̄e > x̄u and x̂
′
e < x̄u if x̄e < x̄u.
Then if x̄e > x̄u and x̂s < x̂
′′
e , individuals with a level of ability within
the range x̄u < xi < x̂
′
e will become entrepreneurs in the traditional
sector, while those with x̂′e < xi < x̂s become educated and work in the
knowledge sector. If x̄e < x̄u and x̂s < x̂
′′
e , individuals with a level of
ability within the range x̄u < xi < x̂s will become educated and work
in the knowledge sector.
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Additionally, if x̂s > x̂
′′
e , individuals with x̂
′′
e < xi < x̂s will become
entrepreneurs in the traditional sector.
• For xi > x̂s, individuals choose between not studying and being en-
trepreneurs in the traditional sector or studying and being entrepreneurs
in the knowledge sector. Individuals decide to get educated when
xi > x̃e, where x̃e satisfies:
−1
x̃e
+ πs (x̃e) = wu (1 + r) + πu (x̃e) .
Then, when x̃e > x̂s, those with xi < x̃e will choose not to study and
to be entrepreneurs in the traditional sector, while those with xi > x̃e
will choose to study and be entrepreneurs in the knowledge sector. If
x̃e < x̂s, then all individuals with xi > x̂s will be entrepreneurs in
the knowledge sector. This last case will only be possible if x̄e > x̄u,
otherwise there would not be entrepreneurs in the traditional sector in
equilibrium.
Note that x̂s > x̂
′′
e implies that VEu (x̂s) < VEs (x̂s), therefore, x̃e > x̂s,
and viceversa.
Summary of the results for case 1 :
• if x̄e > x̄u and x̂′′e > x̂s > x̃e (Figure 4):
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xi Education decision Occupation decision




(x̂′e, x̂s) yes ws
(x̂s, 1) yes πs
• if x̄e > x̄u and x̂′′e < x̂s < x̃e (Figure 3):
xi Education decision Occupation decision







(x̂′′e , x̂s) no πu
(x̂s, x̃e) no πu
(x̃e, 1) yes πs
• if x̄e < x̄u and x̂′′e > x̂s > x̃e:
xi Education decision Occupation decision
(0, x̄e) no wu
(x̄e, x̄u) yes ws
(x̄u, x̂s) yes ws
(x̂s, 1) yes πs
This case can not be an equilibrium, since there are not any entrepreneurs
in the traditional sector.
• if x̄e < x̄u and x̂′′e < x̂s < x̃e (Figure 5):
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xi Education decision Occupation decision
(0, x̄e) no wu




(x̂′′e , x̂s) no πu
(x̂s, x̃e) no πu
(x̃e, 1) yes πs










Here we solve the choices defined in the value function (14).
• For xi < x̄u, the situation is the same as in case 1.
• For x̄u < xi < x̄s, they choose between studying and working in the
knowledge sector or being entrepreneurs in the traditional sector. Note
that in this range, ws > πu (xi) > wu (by definition of x̄u and x̄s).
−1
x̂e
+ ws = wu (1 + r) + πu (x̂e) .
There are two ability levels that leave individuals indifferent between
the two options: x̂′e and x̂
′′
e . Let’s see if they are within the range
x̄u < xi < x̄s.
If VEu (x̄e) > VWs (x̄e) = VWu (x̄e), that is if πu (x̄e) > wu, then x̂
′
e > x̄u.
This is satisfied if x̄e > x̄u and not satisfied if x̄e < x̄u.
Moreover, since πu (x̂e)−ws = −1/x̂e−wu (1 + r) < 0 and πu (x̄s) = ws,
it must be that x̂′′e < x̄e.
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Then if x̄e > x̄u individuals with level of ability within the range x̄u <
xi < x̂
′
e will become entrepreneurs in the traditional sector, those with
x̂′e < xi < x̂
′′
e become educated and work in the knowledge sector, and
those with x̂′′e < xi < x̄s will become entrepreneurs in the traditional
sector.
If x̄e < x̄u individuals with level of ability within the range x̄u < xi < x̂
′′
e
become educated and work in the knowledge sector, and those with
x̂′′e < xi < x̄s will become entrepreneurs in the traditional sector.
• For x̄s < xi < x̃s, they choose between not studying and being en-
trepreneurs in the traditional sector or to study and being entrepreneurs
in the same sector. In this case, no one wants to pay the cost of edu-




+ πu (xi) < wu (1 + r) + πu (xi) for all xi.
• For xi > x̃s, they choose between not studying and being entrepreneurs
in the traditional sector or to study and being entrepreneurs in the




+ πs (x̃e) = wu (1 + r) + πu (x̃e) .
Notice that πs (x̃e) > πu (x̃e), therefore, since πs (x̃s) = πu (x̃s), x̃e > x̃s.
Then those with x̃e > xi > x̃s will choose not to study and to be
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entrepreneurs in the traditional sector, while those with xi > x̃e will
choose to study and be entrepreneurs in the knowledge sector.
Summary of the results for case 2 :
• If x̄e > x̄u (Figure 3):
xi Education decision Occupation decision







(x̂′′e , x̄s) no πu
(x̄s, x̃s) no πu
(x̃s, x̃e) no πu
(x̃e, 1) yes πs
• If x̄e < x̄u (Figure 5):
xi Education decision Occupation decision
(0, x̄e) no wu




(x̂′e, x̄s) no πu
(x̄s, x̃s) no πu
(x̃s, x̃e) no πu
(x̃e, 1) yes πs
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D Proof of Proposition 2
In any equilibrium, there must be a positive amount of individuals in each












, there is a possibility to have an equilibrium with a
positive amount of entrepreneurs in the knowledge sector.
The value of being unskilled and skilled is
Vu (xi) =




−1/xi + ws if xi < x̄s
−1/xi + πs(xi) if xi ∈ (x̄s, x̃s)
−1/xi + πu(xi) if xi > x̃s
,
respectively.










if 0 < xi < x̄u
max
{





if x̄u < xi < x̄s
max
{





if x̄s < xi < x̃s
max
{





if x̃s < xi < 1
.
The decisions for individuals with xi < x̄s is independent of assumption
1. The choice of the top ability individuals (xi > x̃s) is now to become en-
trepreneurs in the traditional sector, obviously without getting education.
The main difference occurs for individuals with x̄s < xi < x̃s. They choose
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between becoming an entrepreneur in the traditional sector or in the knowl-
edge sector. Let’s denote by x̃e the ability level that leaves the individual
indifferent between the two options. x̃e satisfies:




The LHS is decreasing and concave when assumption 1 is not satisfied.
The RHS is decreasing and convex. Moreover, LHS(0) = ku − ks and
lim
xi→∞
LHS (xi) = −∞ and RHS(0) = 0 and lim
xi→∞
RHS (xi) = 0. Therefore,
the only case where there can be some individuals that prefer to become
entrepreneurs in the knowledge sector is if the LHS and the RHS cross twice.
Let’s denote the two solutions by x̃′e and x̃
′′









By definition of x̃s, πs(x̃s)−πu(x̃s) = 0, and since LHS is decreasing, then
it must be that x̃′′e < x̃s. Therefore, if there is a solution to equation (20)
such that x̃′′e > x̄s, then some individuals will choose to be entrepreneurs in
the knowledge sector.
If x̃′e > x̄s, then individuals with ability x̄s < xi < x̃
′
e will choose to be
entrepreneurs in the traditional sector, those with ability x̃′e < xi < x̃
′′
e will
choose to be entrepreneurs in the knowledge sector, and those with ability
x̃′′e < xi < x̃s will choose to be entrepreneurs in the traditional sector.
If x̃′e < x̄s, then individuals with ability x̄s < xi < x̃
′′
e will choose to be
entrepreneurs in the knowledge sector, and those with ability x̃′′e < xi < x̃s
will choose to be entrepreneurs in the traditional sector.
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To sum up, we present all the options below.
• if x̄e > x̄u and x̃′e > x̄s:
xi Education decision Occupation decision






e ) yes ws
(x̂
′′







(x̃′′e , x̃s) no πu
(x̃s, 1) no πu
• if x̄e > x̄u and x̃′e < x̄s:
xi Education decision Occupation decision











(x̃′′e , x̃s) no πu
(x̃s, 1) no πu
• If x̄e < x̄u and x̃′e > x̄s:
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xi Education decision Occupation decision
(0, x̄e) no wu











(x̃′′e , x̃s) no πu
(x̃s, 1) no πu
• If x̄e < x̄u and x̃′e < x̄s:
xi Education decision Occupation decision
(0, x̄e) no wu








(x̃′′e , x̃s) no πu
(x̃s, 1) no πu
The main difference with the case where assumption 1 is satisfied is that,
if assumption 1 is not satisfied, the top ability range individuals will choose




Bates, T. (1995). Self-employment entry across industry groups. Journal of
Business Venturing, 10(2), 143-156.
Bianchi, M. & Bobba, M. (2017). Liquidity, risk, and occupational
choices. Review of Economic Studies, 80, 491-511.
Blanchflower, D. G. (2000). Self-employment in OECD countries. Labour
Economics, 7(5), 471-505.
Blanchflower, D. G. & Oswald, A.J. (1998). What makes an entrepreneur?
Journal of Labor Economics, 16 (1), 26-60.
Dunn, T., & Holtz-Eakin, D. (2000). Financial capital, human capital,
and the transition to self-employment: Evidence from intergenerational links.
Journal of Labor Economics, 18(2), 282-305.
Eren, O., & Sula, O. (2012). The Effect of Ability on Young Men’s Self-
Employment Decision: Evidence from the NELS. Industrial Relations, 51(4),
916-935.
Eurydice (2015). The structure of the European education systems 2014/15:
Schematic diagrams. EU publication.
Evans, D. S., & Jovanovic, B. (1989). An estimated model of entrepreneurial
choice under liquidity constraints. Journal of Political Economy, 97(4), 808-
827.
Evans, D. S., & Leighton, L. S. (1989). Some Empirical Aspects of En-
trepreneurship. The American Economic Review, 79(3), 519-535.
Hartog, J., van Praag, M. & van der Sluis, J. (2010). If you are so
smart, why aren’t you an entrepreneur? Returns to cognitive and social abil-
49
ity: entrepreneurs versus employees. Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy, 19(4), 947-989.
Holtz-Eakin, D., Joulfaian, D., & Rosen, H. S. (1994). Sticking it out:
entrepreneurial survival and liquidity constraints. Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 102(1), 53-75.
Hurst, E., & Lusardi, A. (2004). Liquidity Constraints, Household Wealth,
and Entrepreneurship. Journal of Political Economy, 112(2), 319-347.
Kim, P. H., Aldrich, H. E., & Keister, L. A. (2006). Access (not) denied:
The impact of financial, human, and cultural capital on entrepreneurial en-
tryin the United States. Small Business Economics, 27(1), 5-22.
Leoni, T., & Falk, M. (2010). Gender and field of study as determinants
of self-employment. Small Business Economics, 34(2), 167-185.
Levine, R., & Rubinstein, Y. (2017). Smart and illicit: who becomes
an entrepreneur and do they earn more? Quarterly Journal of Economics,
132(2), 963-1018.
Lofstrom, M., Bates, T., & Parker, S. C. (2014). Why are some people
more likely to become small-businesses owners than others: Entrepreneurship
entry and industry-specific barriers. Journal of Business Venturing, 29(2),
232-251.
Mestieri, M., Schauer, J., & Townsend, R. M. (2017). Human capital
acquisition and occupational choice: Implications for economic development.
Review of Economic Dynamics, 25, 151-186.
OECD (2018a), Spending on tertiary education (indicator). doi: 10.1787/a3523185-
en (Accessed on 01 August 2018).
OECD (2018b), Long-term unemployment rate (indicator). doi: 10.1787/76471ad5-
50
en (Accessed on 01 August 2018).
Poschke, M. (2013). Who becomes an entrepreneur? Labor market
prospects and occupational choice. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Con-
trol, 37(3), 693-710.
Poschke, M. (2018). The firm size distribution across countries and skill-
biased change in entrepreneurial technology. American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics, 10(3), 1-41.
Salverda, W. & Checchi, D. (2015). Labor market institutions and the
dispersion of wage earnings. In Anthony B. Atkinson,& Franois Bourguignonn
(Eds.), Handbook of Income Distribution, Chapter 18, Vol 2B, 1535-1727. .
Solon, G. (2002). Cross-country differences in intergenerational earnings
mobility. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(3), 59-66.
van Der Sluis, J., van Praag, M., & Vijverberg, W. (2008). Education
and entrepreneurship selection and performance: a review of the empirical
literature. Journal of Economic Surveys, 22(5), 795-841.
World Bank (2018). Doing Business 2012. Indicator: DTF global (DB10-
14 methodology) (Accessed on 01 August 2018).
51
Tables
Table I: Groups of countries.
Group Countries
Group 1 Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden
Group 2 Austria, Germany and the Netherlands
Group 3 Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK and US
Group 4 Belgium, France, Italy and Spain
Group 5 Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Slo-
vak Republic and Slovenia
52























301 5,859 250 1,752 8,162




3,719 8,985 428 1,076 14,208
















5,192 171 445 8 5,816
Elementary oc-
cupations
3,990 910 299 9 5,208
Total 31,377 39,583 5,751 5,746 82,457
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Table III: Distribution of jobs across industries (ISIC).

























978 785 38 42 1,843
Manufacturing 8,028 3,210 595 332 12,165
Construction 3,213 989 1,125 374 5,701
Wholesale and re-
tail
6,143 2,362 1,054 525 10,084
Transportation
and storage
2,997 786 368 87 4,238
Accommodation
and food services
1,877 523 256 230 2,886
Information and
communication
74 2,362 5 461 2,902
Finance and in-
surance
384 2,177 87 203 2,851
Real estate 151 435 43 190 819
Scientific 0 3,251 0 1,329 4,580
Administrative
services
1,900 534 345 164 2,943
Public adminis-
tration
1,434 4,643 19 47 6,143
Education 0 7,963 0 352 8,315
Health and social
work
2,259 7,831 118 789 10,997
Arts and enter-
tainment
258 879 45 327 1,509
Other services 689 629 464 177 1,959
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table VII: Final sample size per group of countries
WO-TS WO-KS SE-TS SE-KS Total
Group 1 3,895 8,247 766 683 13,591
(DK, FI, NO, SE) 28.66 60.68 5.64 5.03
Group 2 5,315 2,855 674 587 9,431
(AT, DE, NL) 56.36 30.27 7.15 6.22
Group 3 7,810 16,637 1,690 2,634 28,771
(CA, IE, UK, US, NZ) 27.15 57.83 5.87 9.16
Group 4 5,577 4,201 1,144 772 11,694
(BE, FR, IT, ES) 47.69 35.92 9.78 6.60
Group 5 8,780 7,643 1,477 1,070 18,970
(CZ, EE, LT, PO, SK, SL) 46.28 40.29 7.79 5.64
Total 31,377 39,583 5,751 5,746 82,457
38.05 48.00 6.97 6.97
WO: worker; SE: self-employed; KS: knowledge sector; TS: traditional sector.
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Table VIII: Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev
Ability dummies:
quartile 1 0.25 0.433
quartile 2 0.25 0.433
quartile 3 0.25 0.433




Higher secondary education 0.43 0.495
Tertiary education 0.45 0.497
Father w/ secondary educ 0.37 0.483










Number of observations 82,457
*Living with spouse or partner.
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